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ABSTRACT
Edward Shils began as a sociologist under the close mentorship of Louis Wirth, with whom he collaborated 
on the translation of Karl Mannheim’s Ideology and Utopia. After 1940, however, Shils’ career, which had 
been focused on topics in sociology, notably the class and occupational structure of cities and on German 
Sociological Theory, took an apparent turn, which in 1946 led him into a relationship with Michael Polanyi, 
a half-time appointment at the London School of Economics, and a new intellectual direction. Part of the 
biographical background to this was personal: his relationship with Wirth ended, and with it his expectation 
of a Ph.D. and his role in the Sociology Department. Yet his new direction had Chicago roots in his work on 
Mannheim, and his relation to Frank Knight and the planning disputes of the 1930s and 40s.  
 Richard Moodey’s fascinating discussion (2012) needs no addition, but it might be useful to say 
something about Edward Shils’ personal trajectory that adds to his autobiography, and is relevant, though in 
obscure ways, to his motivations in relation both to Parsons and Polanyi. The story of Shils’ relation to Talcott 
Parsons is still unwritten, and may never be fully understood. Clearly there was a moment of intellectual ex-
citement during the creation of the general theory of action. Shils’ own account of their work together captures 
some of this. But there is a biographical background to Shils’ (however brief) enthusiasm that sheds some 
small light on the relation of Shils and Polanyi and on Shils’ unusual and indeed frenetic efforts to connect to 
the larger intellectual community, represented for him by Polanyi, and on the specific form that this took. 
The Illusion
 Sociology in the postwar 1940s in the United States was a field on the upswing. The vast new demand 
for college degrees and graduate education produced by the GI bill allowed scholars who were barely surviv-
ing on the margins of academic life during the 1930s and the war to gain secure appointments and thrive. The 
field itself, its status raised by interdisciplinary wartime research, some of which Shils participated in, and 
which Parsons benefitted from, was newly confident and hopeful. The generation of students that came into 
the field at this time were energized by the idea that they were destined to make sociology into a science, as 
part of the larger development of what were being called the behavioral sciences. Psychology and especially 
social psychology were the intellectual ballast for this optimism, which represented a change from sociology’s 
close relation to economics in the prewar period. 
 On the surface, Shils was a full participant in this new mood. He was employed at the University of 
Chicago, which retained its traditional status in sociology, at least in the world at large. He had co-translated 
Ideology and Utopia (Mannheim [1929] 1936) and translated Man and Society in an Age of Reconstruction 
(Mannheim [1935] 1940). His sometime mentor Louis Wirth was a prominent urban sociologist and played 
a large role in the founding of the International Sociological Association in the immediate postwar period. 
Shils’ wartime work on primary groups fit the new mode of social psychological thinking. He was an active 
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presenter to German post-war summer schools for sociology, and a major figure in introducing “American” 
sociology to the London School of Economics. For Europe and Britain, he was a representative figure. His 
collaboration with Parsons cemented his reputation in the minds of American sociology students. Although 
the book itself, Toward a General Theory of Action (Parsons and Shils 1951) was something of a failure, even 
at Harvard, it left a long tail: it is still cited for its definitions of norms and values.
 But beneath the surface, the story was quite different. In the 1930s, Shils was a marginal figure in 
the Department of Sociology at Chicago. Wirth employed him as a research assistant in a project of surveying 
German sociological theory from 1933 to 1935. This was followed by a year on a grant under the urbanism 
committee, a year as a Marshall Field fellow, and a year at Columbia as a Research Fellow in Teacher’s Col-
lege in 1937-38. In 1938 he returned as an Instructor in Social Science in the College of the University of 
Chicago, meaning that he was not part of the Sociology Department. He was also young. He turned thirty on 
July 1, 1940. 
 As Moodey explains, it was Shils’ relationship to Wirth that led to Shils’ collaboration in the trans-
lating and in some respects transforming of Mannheim’s Ideology and Utopia. This was followed by his solo 
translation of Mannheim’s Man and Society in an Age of Reconstruction, published in 1940. The relationship 
was hierarchical and in a sense exploitative, as many relations of student and mentor were at the time and at 
that University. Alan Sica recalled Shils telling him “bitterly, that Wirth had paid him $90 to translate Ideologie 
und Utopie during one summer when Shils was otherwise hard up for money, that Wirth wrote the intro to the 
published translation with Shils’ help, and that even though the book sold very well indeed for decades, Shils 
never saw a penny of royalties. But he also said that he was so entirely entranced by Mannheim at the time 
(though later he would badmouth him in characteristic fashion) that he would go to some local diner every 
day and spend the entire day translating and have a wonderful time of it.”1 Kettler and Meja note that 
Archival evidence also indicates that Shils composed the lecture notes for Wirth’s first course 
on sociology of knowledge (LWP/66:2 and Shils Interview, 25.8.67. AA). The documentary 
record is unequivocal. All in Shils’ unmistakable handwriting: analytical reading notes on 
Mannheim, Grünwald, Plessner, and others; the analytical outline and the bulk of lecture 
notes for the first offering of Wirth’s Sociology of Knowledge course in 1935 and lectures 
on intellectuals. Even after his departure from Chicago, Shils collaborated with Wirth on 
issues arising out of Ideology and Utopia. Wirth’s 1937 rejoinder to Robert MacIver’s cri-
tique of Mannheim in Atlantic City rests on a detailed memorandum from Shils (LWP/65:4; 
LWP/67:2; Kettler and Meja 1995: 241-42n7).
Wirth continued to teach this course; in 1946, it was one of his main teaching contributions. 
 By 1946, Shils was far removed from this relationship. Although he was secure, he was outside the 
department: an Associate Professor of Sociology in the College, who had taken a half-time position at the 
LSE. Under the organizational scheme of the University of Chicago, this position in the College was a status 
outside and independent of the Department of Sociology. He was not among the “graduate officers” of the 
department. Indeed, matters were worse. His courses were not listed with the department. He was a pariah, for 
reasons that take some explaining. It is this period in which Shils seems to develop his distinctive intellectual 
concerns, especially those which come to align him with Michael Polanyi. 
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 Jefferson Pooley has written an extensive discussion of Shils’ turn against Karl Mannheim during 
this period (2007), a turn which was also a turn in the direction of Michael Polanyi, whom he met only at 
the end of it. Textual evidence of influences is scant during this period, but as Pooley notes, Mannheim was 
being pilloried in some of the most influential books of the period, such as Popper’s The Open Society and 
its Enemies (1950), which listed Mannheim among the enemies. David Kettler and Volker Meja, writing 
from Mannheim’s point of view, discuss Shils’ earlier defense of Mannheim. What follows is to some extent 
a contribution to the discussion of the problem of Shils’ apparent turn, and what he took from Mannheim in 
relation to tradition and ideology, but with an emphasis on the obscure problem of his relation to Wirth.  
The Newcomb Episode
 Shils met Robert Merton in December 1938. They were fellow Philadelphians, similar in ethnic 
background, but not in class. Shils had gone to Penn; Merton to Temple. They had an arm’s length relationship 
over many years. There is a curious footnote to this: Merton was Karl Polanyi’s strong supporter for foundation 
grants in the 1950s, and professed his profound admiration for The Great Transformation (Polanyi 1944) in 
his private letters to funders on Karl’s behalf. Nothing in Merton’s published work expressed this enthusiasm. 
But Merton had a long record of involvement with and support of scientists’ movements on the Left and this 
did leak into print (cf. Turner 2007).
 In 1940, Merton was Chair of the Sociology Department at Tulane, as part of an odd practice in the 
department of appointing and promoting junior scholars who would serve as department chair and enticing 
them by an elevated rank, in this case Associate Professor. In fact, Merton, who was the same age as Shils, had 
a quite astonishing record by this time, aided by his publications with Pitirim Sorokin. His own description 
on his appointment in 1938 listed a book, Science, Technology and Society in Seventeenth Century England 
and “Some twenty articles published in various American, English, French, and Italian journals in the fields 
of sociology, history of science and scientific method.” He also mentioned “Translations from the Italian: 
published in various international journals” and “fifty or sixty extensive book reviews.”2 Shils, in contrast, 
had a few grant reports, three translations, and four minor articles. 
 At the time, Tulane had a very prestigious sister institution for women, Sophie Newcomb College. 
Shils applied. The application is revealing. Shils presents himself as a conventional sociologist. His grant 
work, beyond his study of German sociological theory for Wirth, was about the occupational structure of cit-
ies. His interest, he said, was in researching the middle class in cities, something he could continue in New 
Orleans. The cover letter, written in January of 1940, promised that he will have the Ph.D. by the end of the 
year. According to Shils’ letter to Merton, Wirth encouraged Shils to apply for the job, and Shils tells Merton 
that Wirth’s “account of New Orleans and the problems which it offers for research made the possibility of 
going there genuinely attractive.”3
 Lewis Wirth had been appointed assistant professor at Tulane University in 1928, fresh out of graduate 
school. He had returned to Chicago, where he had received his Ph.D., in 1931, shortly before Shils himself 
arrived. Wirth may have believed he had some influence at Tulane, but perhaps he was mistaken. Although 
he had been well-paid there and had received a prestigious Social Science Research Council grant, he had 
created a problem for the closely linked School of Social Work by giving a talk on “companionate marriage,” 
a controversial topic of the time (cf. Davis 2008), that was reported in the newspapers and had offended the 
Catholic charities in this Catholic city. This was significant: Wirth was appointed in the School of Social 
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Work. The Catholics complained to the administration and threatened to suspend co-operation.4 In any case, 
the position Shils applied for went to a Harvard man with an M.A., Nicholas Demerath, who was appointed 
as an instructor and would not receive his Ph.D. until 1942. 
 In 1940, in short, Shils was eager to embark on a conventional career in sociology, in a position at 
a good women’s school, a pattern that was well-established: W. F. Ogburn, F. S. Chapin, and Harry Elmer 
Barnes, prominent figures of the time, all had started in such schools. Something then happened. It has long 
been a puzzle as to why Shils never finished a Ph.D., and he brushed off the question in later years. But there 
was a pivotal event in Shils’ life. He explains it in his autobiography in these somewhat guarded terms:
I thought and still think that the disputes centering on Robert Hutchins, of which the polem-
ics of Wirth, Gideonse and Knight against Hutchins were only one, did the University much 
harm. During the war, I wrote to that effect to a friend who indiscreetly summarized my 
views to another friend and so the message passed from one person to another to the point 
where it became, “Edward Shils thinks that Louis is foolish.” That is the form in which it 
came to Wirth. Naturally he was offended. That was a sad ending to a relationship from 
which I have benefitted and for which I am grateful (2006: 46).
This understates the situation. Shils was completely dependent on Wirth for any sort of future in Sociology. 
On the (handwritten) vita he sent to Merton, Shils listed two other sociology references from Chicago: Ernest 
Burgess and Earl Johnson. Johnson was powerless, and not even a part of the department (he spent his career 
running the interdisciplinary MA for the Division of Social Science); Burgess was not close to Shils, and Shils 
later had harsh words for him. The promised Ph.D. never materialized.
 The break with Wirth must have been brutal, but it was private. After Wirth’s death, the department, 
desperate to catch up to Columbia and Harvard, and in need of a theorist, discussed Shils. A memo referred 
to the need to knock down barriers. As Hughes explained, 
By knocking down the barriers I mean fuller use of the university’s resources outside the 
department. One of the first things I did last fall was to speak to Ed Shils about listing his 
courses in our department. They were so listed. I am glad that the department is minded to 
have us pursue this collaboration further and have, in accordance with the recent motion, 
written to Shils on the point.5 
This is revealing on many levels, but one point is obvious: Shils had no friends in the department, or this 
situation would not have gone on for over a decade. 
 Wirth had stood in his way not only as an enemy, but as someone with almost identical interests. 
Wirth is, of course, remembered as an Urban Sociologist. But this was not how he saw himself. Herbert Blumer 
recounts a “personal conversation” about Wirth’s own aspirations just before his death in 1952.  He spoke to 
Herbert Blumer: 
Even though he had already attained the highest eminence in the field of sociology, a brilliant 
future still lay ahead of Dr. Wirth. In a personal conversation a few days before his death 
he had indicated his intention to restrict the broad range of his interests and to focus his 
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efforts more centrally on the development of systematic social theory (Blumer 1952: 69).
Elsewhere he confirmed this primary interest in theory, and added that 
My second interest is in what is known as the sociology of knowledge. This is a field which 
is misnamed and with the misnaming of which, unfortunately, I have had something to do. 
It should rather be called the sociology of intellectual life. You may recall that I translated 
and wrote a rather extensive introduction to Mannheim’s Ideology and Utopia and thus 
introduced this work to the English-speaking public. I have written very little in this field 
myself, aside from an article or two, but I have underway a monograph on the sociology 
of science which I hope will have some value. I have also directed a number of Doctors’ 
theses in this field, such as one on the sociology of art and another one on the sociology of 
literature which begin to open these fields to empirical inquiry (Odum [1951] 1969: 231).
Shils was erased from this recollection. But it is notable that Wirth taught a seminar in Sociology of Knowledge 
during the 1940s.6 Shils later taught his NEH Seminar on the topic under the title “Sociology of Intellectuals.”7 
Their professed interests, as distinct from what Wirth was best known for and published on, were very close. 
Ideology and Tradition
 In 1941, Shils published a short paper on Mannheim’s Man and Society, which he had translated. 
The paper appeared in an odd place: The Journal of Liberal Religion. But it appeared in the pages following 
another paper that was very consequential, Robert Merton’s “Karl Mannheim and the Sociology of Knowl-
edge.” Despite Merton’s somewhat oily praise of Mannheim, the text as a whole was a devastating hatchet 
job, showing Merton at his most destructive and erudite best. Merton focused on the problem of reflection, of 
just how ideas were supposed to reflect social position, and on the idea of total ideologies, that is to say the 
encompassing worldviews that were supposed to characterize groups. 
 Merton showed that the notion of reflection was incoherent. He lists Mannheim’s usages:
 
. . . follow inevitably and unwittingly from certain causal determinants (G, p. 54).
. . . bound up with and grow out of a certain social reality .... (G, p. 72).
. . . in harmony with it. The same estrangement goes on with reference to knowledge. . . 
(G, p. 76).
. . .  rooted in a definite Weltanschauung and has progressed in close connection with definite 
political interests (G, p. 148).
. . . outlook in accordance with the structural relationship of the groups representing it (G, 
p. 199).
. . . transformed in close conjunction with social forces. It is never by accident that they 
appear at given moments in the social process (G, p. 223; Merton [1941] 1968: 553; italics 
added by Merton).
These are either empty metaphors or unprovable hypotheses: Mannheim would have liked to show that there 
were causal determinants, but the best he could do was describe the vague connections Merton highlights in 
italics. But it is the concept of total ideology that is Merton’s main target, for it is unclear where its application 
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ends, or why it would end. Why should science be exempt? Why should Mannheim’s own theory be exempt? 
What we might call the liberal theory of ideology, to which Shils (and Polanyi) later adhered, made a sharp 
distinction between ideological and non-ideological thinking. For them there could be an end to ideology—not 
so for the Mannheimian notion of total ideology. 
 What was Shils thinking at the time? We can glean some clues from the paper that came in the next 
pages. Shils is explicitly not writing a critique of Mannheim, and the text he is discussing is not primarily 
about ideology. Nevertheless, Shils treatment gives us some clues to his attitude toward Mannheim at this 
crucial point, and about how Shils was thinking about the larger problem of ideology. The framework is one 
that Shils, Merton, and Polanyi all shared: the problem of planning.8  And by this time the crucial arguments 
are already present: there was no need to wait for Hayek’s The Road to Serfdom of 1944. As Shils says,
Observation of the totalitarian regimes has led to the view, widely held, that planning and 
dictatorship are identical, that planning necessarily involves dictatorial power, and further-
more that the expansion of governmental control over private economic activity must end 
ultimately not only in the loss of entrepreneurial liberties but of all other significant liberties 
as well. (1941: 151)
 Shils characterizes Mannheim as seeking to refute this argument. And although Shils praises the book 
for its seriousness and depth, his comments indicate, in a gentler but quite explicit way, that he thinks this book 
is marred by the same kinds of problems that Merton points out: that crucial issues are passed over blithely, as 
when Shils notes that “He is rather light-heartedly optimistic about the possibilities of parliamentary control 
over bureaucratic experts” (1941: 152). 
 The praise is in any case often double-edged: he begins the review by commenting that “Mannheim 
places himself in the line which proceeds directly from the French 18th and the English 19th centuries” (1941: 
148), but does so in the language of social science. The fact that Hayek was at the same time writing on the 
abuse of reason is revealing: by this time there was something naive and even sinister about promoting plan-
ning in the name of rationality (Ebenstein 2001: 107-108). When Shils comes to the shortcomings of the book, 
he says they are
numerous: the formulations are seldom free from ambiguity; the propositions remain too 
frequently on the level of generality and are accompanied neither by the corroborative 
evidence which is available in many cases nor by illustrations which would heighten the 
plausibility of those propositions which are still in the hypothetical stage (1941: 153).
This is to say in a mild way what Merton said in a brutal way about Ideology and Utopia.    
The Bridge to Ideology and Tradition
 Shils, in short, had all the material he needed to repudiate Mannheim before he went to England. That 
he was further influenced by the more radical attacks of Popper, Hayek, and ultimately Michael Polanyi, there 
can be little doubt. But, armed with his knowledge of the thought of Frank Knight, himself an active polemicist, 
Shils was already deeply engaged with the issues that divided these thinkers. Indeed, Knight is cited in Shils’ 
paper on Man and Society. Nevertheless, there is an open question about the extent to which Shils and even 
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Michael Polanyi himself was influenced by Mannheim’s Ideology and Utopia, an issue Moodey captures nicely 
by quoting the comment by Nye, that “Mannheim’s sociology of knowledge is the shark cruising beneath the 
waters of Polanyi’s argument” (Nye 2011: 280).
 With Shils, the issue is superficially clear: his later writing on ideology pointedly did not use 
Mannheim’s categories, and endorsed a “liberal” conception that contrasted ideological to non-ideological 
thinking (Shils 1968). When the mass ideological parties lost their grip in the 1950s with the end of the clas-
sic proletariat, that was “the end of ideology” of that kind. Even writers on the Left at the time, such as Otto 
Kirchheimer, understood this when they complained about the interest-based parties that took over in the 
1950s: they were nostalgic for the coherence and attachment of the unifying all-encompassing parties of the 
1920s, and regarded the new parties as alienating (Kirchheimer 1961: xxix; Turner 2011). What was missed 
was precisely the kind of ideological party of the past, which was tied to a vast set of workers’ institutions 
that promoted this viewpoint. 
 Mannheim’s conception was more encompassing, because he wished to apply it to liberalism, which 
lacked these institutions and disclaimed such ideas as a party line, and to conservatism, which lacked even the 
kind of articulation of ideas found in liberalism. But his terms are confusing, and there are multiple notions to 
be found there. The translators intended to clean some of this up, and to some extent they did, but Mannheim 
wished the book to be understood as a kind of open-ended experiment rather than a closed argument, so he 
resisted. The net result was confusion. 
 Some of the confusion is with Mannheim’s terms. What he calls utopias are what nowadays would be 
called ideologies. Utopian elements are ideas and values that arise in social groups and organize experience, 
but at the same time represent a wish that goes beyond experience, and potentially lead to demands that burst 
through the existing order. What Mannheim calls ideology, in contrast, works like this: “Thought becomes 
illuminated when a concrete situation is penetrated, not merely through acting and doing, but also through the 
thinking which must go with them” (Mannheim [1929] 1936: 128). Mannheim’s emphasis was on the social 
location of thought, but he pairs this with the term “concreteness.” 
This is the novelty in our approach, also in the field of logic and in the analysis of concrete 
human thinking.  The point of departure of the “sociology of knowledge” is the “connected-
ness to existence (Seinsverbundenheit),” the “situational determination” (Situationsgebun-
denheit) of thinking–and not “thinking in general” (Mannheim Mensch und Gesellschaft 
(1935: 164-5, cited in Kettler & Meja 1995: 194-95). 
Curiously, this passage disappears from Shils’ translation of Man and Society (Kettler & Meja 1995: 195).
 The term “concrete human thinking” is a tip off. An ideology, as Mannheim used the term, was as-
sociated with something very concrete—with a form of activity, or in current terms, a practice. He confused 
the issue by borrowing quasi-Marxist language suggesting some sort of Überbau relation. He confused it more 
by borrowing neo-Kantian language and introducing the notion of total ideology, which as Merton noted seems 
to have no limits, and to apply to thinking in general.  
 Polanyi opposed what he saw as an ideological, or as Mannheim would perhaps have said, utopian 
understanding of science. Bernal and the Left saw science as technology: their “wish” was for society to be 
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organized scientifically, meaning planned, which they believed they could easily do. This was a wish with 
great attractive power, as Polanyi saw. But it represented for him a misunderstanding of science. And here 
there is a certain convergence with Mannheim: Polanyi thought that science needed instead to be understood 
as a concrete activity together with the thinking that goes with it, to use Mannheim’s phrase. 
 Whether Polanyi read Mannheim’s book, or read it this way, we do not know. But in this mish-mash 
we do find ideas that stay both with Shils and Polanyi: the interest in concrete acting and doing and the think-
ing that goes with them, and the critique of ideological thinking. This is in some sense the core of the notion 
of tradition and it is Polanyi’s startling and radical application of the term to the activity of science itself. 
This is a weak reed on which to construct an argument. But in fact there were many strands that connect these 
thinkers within the ferment of the time. This ferment, which as the example of Knight shows, was already 
bubbling in Chicago in the late 1930s, produced the great texts of Hayek, Popper, Oakeshott, Eliot, and the 
rest in the 40s. Shils, academically orphaned, was well-prepared for this moment and seized it. 
Endnotes
 1Personal Communication, March 22, 2013. 
 2Merton File, Biographical Record, University News Bureau, Louisiana Research Collection, 
University Archives, Tulane University, New Orleans, LA. 
 3Edward Shils to Robert Merton, January 18, 1940, Merton RK Collection, Box 79, Folder 4, Co-
lumbia University Rare Books & Manuscript Library.
 4Tulane University Archives, Louisiana Research Collection, University Archives, Tulane Univer-
sity, New Orleans, LA.  
 5Everett Hughes, Chairman, March 14, 1953. Memorandum to Department of Sociology, p. 2. 
Philip W. Hauser papers, Box 14, Folder 11, Department of Special Collections, The Joseph Regenstein 
Library, The University of Chicago. 
 6Kettler and Meja make a point of the difference between a sociology of intellectuals and one of knowl-
edge, and criticize Wirth for opting for the weaker formulation (1995: 234-35). But this was Shils’ choice as well, 
and this was not unconnected to his view of ideology. Intellectuals for him had a special role in relation to the central 
ideals of society that led to their antinomianism. And as Moody notes, this was a point that Polanyi came to accept. 
 7Scope Note, Louis Wirth Papers, Special Collections Research Center, University of Chicago Library. 
 8Merton, crucially, is on the other side: he was to write at the same time that the fulfillment of science 
was possible only under Communism, a claim he later deleted (Turner 2007). 
References
Blumer, Herbert. 1952. “In Memoriam: Louis Wirth, 1897-1952.” American Journal of Sociology 58: 69. 
http://www.asanet.org/about/presidents/Louis_Wirth.cfm (Accessed March 19, 2013).
Davis, Rebecca L. 2008. “‘Not Marriage at All, but Simple Harlotry’: The Companionate Marriage Contro-
versy.” The Journal of American History, March: 1137-63.
Ebenstein, Alan. 2001. Friedrich Hayek: A Biography. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.
Hayek, F. A. 1944. The Road to Serfdom. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.
Kettler, David, and Volker Meja. 1995. Karl Mannheim and the Crisis of Liberalism: The Secret of These New 
Times. New Brunswick, NJ and London: Transaction.
51
Kirchheimer, Otto. 1961. Political Justice. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Mannheim, Karl. [1929] 1936. Ideology and Utopia: An Introduction to the Sociology of Knowledge. Translated 
by Lewis Wirth & Edward Shils. New York: Harcourt, Brace & World.
_____. [1935] 1940. Man and Society in an Age of Reconstruction. Translated by Edward Shils. New York: 
Harcourt, Brace and Company.
Merton, Robert. [1941] 1968. “Karl Mannheim and the Sociology of Knowledge.” In Social Theory and Social 
Structure, Rev. and Enl. Glencoe, IL: Free Press, pp. 543-562.
Moodey, Richard. 2012. “Polanyi, Shils, and the Action Frame of Reference.” Paper presented at the annual 
meeting of the Polanyi Society, Chicago, Loyola University, June.
Nye, M. J. 2011. Michael Polanyi and His Generation: Origins of the Social Construction of Science. Chicago: 
The University of Chicago Press.
Odum, Howard W. [1951] 1969. American Sociology: The Story of Sociology in the United States through 
1950. New York: Greenwood Press.
Parsons, Talcott and Edward Shils. 1951. Toward a General Theory of Action. Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press.
Polanyi, Karl. 1944. The Great Transformation: The Political and Economic Origins of Our Time. Boston: 
Beacon Press.
Pooley, Jefferson. 2007. “Edward Shils’ Turn Against Karl Mannheim: The Central European Connection.” 
The American Sociologist 38: 364-82.
Popper, Karl. 1950. The Open Society and Its Enemies. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Shils, Edward. 1941. “Irrationality and Planning: A Note on Mannheim’s Man and Society in an Age of Trans-
formation.” The Journal of Liberal Religion 2(Winter): 148-153.
_____.  1968. “Mannheim, Karl.” In D. Sills (Ed.) International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences. New
 York: Macmillan, pp. 557-561.
_____.  1974. “Ideology and Utopia by Karl Mannheim.” Daedalus 103(1): 83-89. 
_____.  2006. A Fragment of a Sociological Autobiography: The History of My Pursuit of a Few Ideas. Edited 
by Steven Grosby. New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Press.
Turner, Stephen. 2007. “Merton’s ‘Norms’ in Political and Intellectual Context.” Journal of Classical Sociol-
ogy 7(2): 161-178.
_____.  2011. “Schmitt, Telos, the Collapse of the Weimar Constitution, and the Bad Conscience of the Left.” 
In Timothy W. Luke and Ben Agger (eds.) A Journal of No Illusions: Telos, Paul Piccone, and the 
Americanization of Critical Theory. New York: Telos Press. pp. 115-140. 
